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Chaos has been used in cryptography for years and many chaotic cryptographic systems have
been proposed. Their securities are often evaluated by conducting conventional statistical tests,
however few studies have referred to the security issue of the chaotic hardware cryptographic
systems. This paper evaluates the security of the chaotic cryptographic system from a hardware
perspective by using the side channel analysis attack. First, a chaotic block cryptosystem is
designed and implemented based on an Atmel microcontroller. Then the conventional statistical
security tests, including SP 800-22 test, characters frequency test, avalanche test etc., are used to
verify its security performance. In the meantime, the correlation power analysis attack is carried
out for the security evaluation. Experimental results demonstrate that even though the chaotic
cryptographic system can pass the conventional statistical tests, it still has the probability to
be attacked from a hardware perspective using the leaked side channel information including
execution time and power consumption etc. This paper proposes another way to analyze the
security of the chaotic cryptosystem, which can aid designing mechanisms to enhance the security
of the hardware cryptosystems in the future.
Keywords: Side Channel Analysis; Correlation Power Analysis; Chaotic Block Cipher; Round
Keys
1. Introduction
Information security has been gaining dramatic importance in the increasingly severe information security
environment. Progresses have been made in the fields of cryptography and cryptanalysis to enhance the
information security. As one emerging field, the chaotic cryptosystems have attracted many research at-
tentions [Kocarev & Lian, 2011; Liu et al., 2017]. The chaotic system is a deterministic, non-linear system,
which is sensitive to the initial conditions and parameters [Liu et al., 2016; Pareschi et al., 2009; Luo
et al., 2015]. The inherently correlation between chaos and cryptography [Kocarev & Lian, 2011] inspires
researchers to combine cryptography with chaos. Many chaotic cryptographic algorithms have been pro-
posed [Luo et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2004; Eyebe Fouda et al., 2014; Elgendy et al., 2016].
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The security of those cryptosystems mainly depends on the complexity of encryption algorithms. In the
meantime, the cryptanalysis of the chaotic cryptosystem has never stopped. Conventional mathematical-
based methods have been proposed for the chaotic cryptosystem cryptanalysis, where most of them are
based on the known/chosen plaintext attacks [Li et al., 2009a,b, 2008; Li & Lo, 2011; Zhang et al., 2017a].
Adversaries utilize the plaintexts, ciphertexts and the characteristics of the algorithms to conduct the
attacks.
Further from the hardware system perspective, when the cryptosystems are in operation, some un-
expected side channel information probably leak from the cryptosystems, e.g. the execution time, power
consumption and electromagnetic radiation. The side channel analysis (SCA) attack utilizes the side chan-
nel information to attack these cryptographic systems. The research of SCA attack and its countermeasure
is a crucial branch of cryptography. It has been developing over twenty years. The SCA attack was first
introduced in the approach of [Kocher, 1996], where the timing analysis attack was used to break a Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem. Timing analysis utilizes the relevance between the execution time
and the key to attack the systems. Then the simple power analysis (SPA) attack and the differential power
analysis (DPA) attack were proposed as two typical power analysis (PA) attack methods [Kocher et al.,
1999]. The PA attack performs key analysis utilizing the power consumption information correlated with
the operations and the intermediate data. As another attack method, template attack was proposed in
the approach of [Chari et al., 2002]. To conduct this attack, a distribution model of the side channel in-
formation should be set up first, i.e. an identical experimental platform is needed. By using this method,
the cryptosystem can be broken with less information than DPA attack. Then correlation power analysis
(CPA) attack was proposed in the approach of [Brier et al., 2004]. It utilizes the correlation between the
power consumption and the data being proceeded in the cryptosystem. Compared to the DPA, the CPA is
more robust and efficient [Brier et al., 2004]. As a branch of SCA, electromagnetic analysis attack depends
on the correlations between the operations of cryptosystems and the electromagnetic field surrounding the
devices [Gandolfi et al., 2001]. Its advantage is that the adversary does not need direct contacts with the
cryptosystems to conduct the attack.
The security of a chaos-based random number generator (RNG) was tested using the side-channel
information in the approach of [Pareschi et al., 2009]. It verified one common argument, i.e. whether the
chaotic system can be predicted due to its inherent deterministic nature. The RNG was implemented based
on 0.35µm complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) technology and the PA attack was used
to conduct the attack. The result showed that the internal state of the chaotic hardware system cannot
be retrieved through the PA attack, and the security performance was verified. However, only the security
of the hardware RNG was evaluated. The chaotic cryptosystems also include other components (e.g. flash
memory [Cao et al., 2016]) which may lead to the risk of leaking side channel information. It is also
very common that the cryptosystems are designed based on the micro controllers (i.e. using the embedded
software [Zhang et al., 2017b]) where the power analysis attack can be performed. Therefore, the security of
chaotic cryptosystems should be considered and analyzed entirely. This work analyzes whether the chaotic
system is vulnerable to the SCA attack. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first research
work to analyze and evaluate the security performance of the hardware chaotic cryptosystems using the
side channel information. The cryptosystem is designed based on chaotic systems and its performance is
evaluated using the conventional methods such as SP 800-22 test, entropy test and a set of dependence
tests. Then the CPA attack is employed to attack the proposed chaotic cryptosystems and the security
performance is analyzed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction of SCA attack
and chaotic systems. Section 3 illustrates the theory of CPA attack and the chaotic block cipher used in
this paper in detail. Section 4 analyzes the statistical security of the proposed cryptographic algorithm,
introduces the experimental platform, and gives the power analysis results. Section 5 concludes this paper
and discusses the future work.
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2. Overview of Power Analysis and Chaos
Most cryptosystems are implemented on electronic devices, which may leak side channel information (e.g.
electromagnetic, power and time consumption etc.). Side channel information is correlated with the opera-
tions being performed during encryption or decryption processes [Kocher, 1996]. For example, a processor
may take a longer execution time and more power to perform a multiplication than an addition operation.
Side channel information also correlates with the data being processed. For instance, more power may be
consumed when transforming the hexadecimal byte from 0x00 to the 0xFF than transforming from 0x00
to 0x01, due to that changing more bits from previous to the next states means more registers need to
be switched (this leads to consuming more energy). Even if the power consumption differences caused by
processing different data are quite small, the critical information can be exposed to the adversary by given
enough power traces, using the DPA or CPA attack [Kocher, 1996].
2.1. Power analysis attack
Most of the modern digital systems are implemented based on CMOS technology, whose power consumption
can be calculated by
Ptotal = Pstat + Pdyn, (1)
where Ptotal, Pstat and Pdyn are the total, static and dynamic power consumption, respectively [Le et al.,
2007]. The Pstat can be extremely low [Rabaey et al., 2003] which is caused by the leakage current or
the current that keeps the system running. The Pdyn is due to the instantaneous short-circuit current
and the charging or discharging of load capacitance when the circuit states changed. The Ptotal is mainly
contributed by the Pdyn [Le et al., 2007]. Therefore, the critical information (e.g. plaintext or ciphertext)
corresponding to these transitions can be analyzed using DPA or CPA attack. In order to reduce the
computational complexities of the attacks, DPA and CPA attack methods divide the cipher key into
several parts, where each part is attacked separately. For example, for a brute force search of a 128-bit
cipher key, the computational complexity is equal to 2128. If dividing the cipher key into 16 parts and
attacking each part separately, the computational complexity is 16× 28 = 212 which is greatly reduced.
The DPA and CPA attacks utilize the correlations between the intermediate data and the power
consumption for the cryptanalysis. To conduct a DPA attack, a number of randomly generated plaintexts
are used as the input for the cryptosystem. During the processes of encryption, their corresponding power
traces are collected. A selection function that uses plaintexts and one possible key as parameters partitions
the power traces into two subsets. If the possible key is correct, the two subsets present different characters,
e.g. in one subset, all the specific bits of intermediate data equal to 1, and in the other subset, they equal
to 0. Then differential operation makes the differences between these two subsets prominent. If the possible
key is incorrect, the two power subsets are very random. There is no apparent difference between them.
Thus, the differential operation does not generate high values. The DPA also faces some problems, such
as the ghost peak, lack of robustness and others [Brier et al., 2004]. The CPA attack can overcome these
drawbacks. It calculates the correlations between the actual power consumption and hypothetical power
consumption [Li et al., 2008]. The hypothetical power consumption is generated from a power consumption
model, which takes the plaintexts and a possible key as input. The key which corresponds to the largest
correlation coefficient is the most likely correct key. More details about the CPA are provided in Section
3.2.
2.2. Chaotic systems
Chaos is a widely studied phenomenon in the fields of science and engineering, such as in the subject
of climate [Stehl´ık et al., 2016], the dynamical system control [Messadi & Mellit, 2017], chemical aspects
[Bodale & Oancea, 2015], etc. Chaotic systems are highly complex nonlinear dynamic systems. Although
their models are deterministic, they can generate pseudo-random sequences. The chaotic systems have three
main characteristics [Kocarev & Lian, 2011]: a). the sensitivity to initial values; b). the pseudo-randomness
of its orbit; and c). the feasible implementations in both hardware and software. These features are related to
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the characters of the conventional cipher algorithms [Elgendy et al., 2016]. Thus, chaotic systems have been
used as an alternative solution for the cryptosystems [Chen et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2016]. In next section, a
cryptosystem based on a chaotic system is designed and the security performance is analyzed using various
conventional evaluation methods. The security of the proposed chaotic cryptosystem is cryptanalyzed by
the CPA attack from the hardware perspective.
3. Encryption Algorithm and Cryptanalysis Method
This section proposes a chaotic block cipher algorithm, which is used as the experimental subject for the
CPA attack. In this algorithm, substitution-permutation network is used. The round keys are generated
by a chaotic map. Then the CPA attack scheme aiming at breaking the proposed encryption algorithm is
given in detail, including the selections of power model and the attack point etc.
3.1. The chaotic block cipher
According to Shannon information theory, confusion and diffusion are two fundamental properties of the
encryption algorithms [Shannon, 1949]. Confusion makes the statistical relationships between the plaintext,
ciphertext and keys as complex as possible. Diffusion makes each bit in the plaintext affect multiple bits in
the ciphertext. Theoretically, changing any plaintext bit leads to the changes of half number of ciphertext
bits. In this algorithm, these two properties are satisfied by conducting several alternating rounds of
substitution and permutation operations.
The work flow of the chaotic block cipher is shown in the Fig. 1, where both a block of plaintext and a
block of ciphertext include 128 bits. Round keys are generated based on a tent map, and the 128-bit master
key is used to generate the chaotic parameters. The output of the chaotic system is mapped to the integer
between 0 and 255 to get the round keys. After adding the round keys, a confusion process is carried out
using an S-box lookup table. Then a GF (28) addition, multiplication and a Cat Map operation are carried
out to meet the diffusion property, where GF (28) denotes the Galois field with order 28. These steps are
iterated for M times to ensure the security.
Key
Tent Map S-Box 2-D Cat Map
If Round>M
No
Cipher Text
Yes
Plain Text
Round Keys
GF(28) 
Multiplication
GF(28) 
Addition
Add Round 
Keys
Generate Chaotic 
Parameters
Fig. 1. Work flow of the proposed encryption algorithm
The aforementioned steps of the proposed encryption algorithm are given below in details.
Step 1. Generating the round keys. This chaotic block cipher contains M iterations, for each iteration,
a 16-byte round key is used. Those round keys are generated based on a tent map, which is defined by
f(x, αi) =
{
x
αi
, 0 6 x < αi
1−x
1−αi , αi 6 x < 1
, (2)
where αi is chaotic parameter. Each byte in the master key is transformed to corresponding αi by
αi = 0.51 +Ki/1000, (3)
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where the ith byte of the master key is denoted as Ki and i ∈ [1, 16]. To ensure the randomness of the
round keys, for each parameter αi, the tent map is iterated for 20 times. For the first chaotic parameter α1,
iterate the tent map f(x, α1) for 20 times to get the iteration result xpara(1), where the initial value x0 is a
decimal number between 0 and 1 (in this paper it is randomly set as 0.5987). For each rest parameter αi,
iterate f(x, α) for 20 times, using αi and the previous iteration result xpara(i−1) as parameter and initial
value respectively. It is described by
xpara(i) = f
20(xpara(i−1), αi). (4)
Finally, using the final iteration result xpara(16) and α16 as the initial iteration value and parameter
respectively, iterate the tent map for 100 + 16M times to generate a decimal number sequence (between 0
and 1) where each element is denoted as xi and i ∈ [1, 100 + 16M ]. To guarantee the randomness, the first
100 elements are discarded. The real number xi is rounded to get the i
th byte of round key (i.e. ki), which
is achieved by
ki = floor(xi × 255), (5)
where floor(x) is the function that returns the maximal integer not greater than x.
Step 2. Adding the round keys. In the first round of encryption, the ith byte of the intermediate data
is calculated by
si = ki ⊕ ci, (6)
where ci is the i
th byte of the plain text. For the rest rounds of encryption, the result is the product of
exclusive-or operation between the round keys and the temporary result from the previous round.
Step 3. The permutation procedure. It is carried out by substituting the data through an S-box. There
are many ways to generate an S-box, such as using chaotic system [Wang & Wang, 2014; C¸avuolu et al.,
2017], artificial construction, and mathematical construction [Trappe & Washington, 2006]. The S-box used
in the AES algorithm is used directly in this work, and it is generated through the mathematical method
[Trappe & Washington, 2006].
Step 4. The diffusion operation. A round of diffusion operation that includes two stages is implemented
in this work. In the first stage, the first byte of intermediate data remains unchanged and the following
elements are calculated by
si+1 = si+1 ⊕ si, (7)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 15. In the second stage, the last byte of intermediate value remains unchanged, and the
former bytes are calculated by
si =
{
si+1 × si, si+1 6= 0
si, si+1 = 0
. (8)
Step 5. 2-D cat map. To improve the performance of confusion and diffusion, a 2-D cat map is im-
plemented. The 2-D cat map is used to disorder the data stored in a square matrix. If the input cannot
be reshaped into a square matrix, some padding schemes can be used, such as ANSI X.923, ISO10126,
PKCS7, etc. In this paper, the intermediate values generated from above steps are organized in a 4 × 4
matrix, and then the Arnold cat map is applied by
[
xn+1
yn+1
]
=
[
1 1
1 2
] [
xn
yn
]
mod N, (9)
where N stands for the size of the matrix, xn stands for the original column index of the matrix, and
yn stands for the original row index. After this operation, the intermediate data located at (xn, yn) is
transformed to the new location (xn+1, yn+1).
Step 6. Repeating the steps 2-5 for M times.
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The chaotic block cipher system completes the encryption through the aforementioned steps 1-6. Its
security performance is analyzed using the conventional statistical methods such as NIST SP 800-22 test,
completeness test, avalanche test and strict avalanche test in Section 4. In next subsection, the details
about the CPA is given and the procedures about applying the CPA attack to the chaotic block cipher
system is presented.
3.2. The CPA attack
The CPA has advantages over the DPA in many aspects, such as the efficiency, robustness, and the required
quantity of power information [Brier et al., 2004]. In this paper, the CPA attack is used to get the crucial
information utilizing the correlation between the intermediate keys and the power consumption. To attack
the chaotic block cipher, the power model that converts the numerical information of intermediate data
into the power consumption information should be selected and the point where the intermediate data be
attacked should be selected.
3.2.1. The selection of power model
Two commonly used power consumption models are Hamming weight and Hamming distance models [Brier
et al., 2004]. The Hamming weight of a byte is the number of bits with high value, and the Hamming distance
between two bytes is denoted by the number of different bits between them. The Hamming weight of v0
is denoted as HW (v0) and the Hamming distance between two values v0 and v1 is denoted as HD(v0, v1).
The relationships between the two models are
(a) The Hamming distance between two values v0 and v1 can be expressed by the Hamming weight of the
XOR result of these two values, which is described by
HD(v0, v1) = HW (v0 ⊕ v1). (10)
(b) If all the bits of v0 are equal to zero, Eq. (10) is changed to
HD(v0, v1) = HW (0⊕ v1) = HW (v1). (11)
(c) Similarly, if all the bits of v0 are equal to 1, Eq. (10) is changed to
HD(v0, v1) = HW (v˜1) = n−HW (v1), (12)
where n denotes the total bit number of v1.
The power consumption of the CMOS circuit is related to the number of bits transforming from the
previous state to the current state. The Hamming distance model can well characterize the states changes
happened on the bus or in register [Mangard et al., 2007]. However, applying this model requires the
knowledge of current and previous data transferred on the data bus, which is difficult for adversaries to
meet this requirement [Mangard et al., 2007]. However, many current micro controllers use pre-charge buses
where all bits on the bus are set to high before the state changes. In this situation, the Hamming distance
model turns to Eq. (12). The power consumption is negatively correlated with the Hamming weight of the
data being proceeded. In this paper, the Hamming weight model is used, because pre-charge bus is used
in the used cryptosystem.
3.2.2. The selection of the attack point
In the first round of the encryption algorithm, the first three steps are shown in Fig. 2. When a cryptographic
system is in operation, some intermediate data are generated (such as the e
′
i and the ei). They are related to
the plaintext and the key. When a cryptographic system processes them, the system leaks the corresponding
amount of power consumption. Based on the working mechanism of the cryptographic algorithm, these
intermediate data can be calculated using the plaintext and the key. Then the possible values of these
intermediates can be converted to hypothetical power consumption using the Hamming weight model.
Therefore, the hypothetical power generated from the plaintext and the correct keys can get the largest
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𝑐0 𝑐1 𝑐2 … 𝑐15 𝑘0 𝑘1 𝑘2 … 𝑘15
𝑒0 𝑒1 𝑒2 … 𝑒15
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕
𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥…𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥 𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥 𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥
𝑒0
′ 𝑒′1 𝑒′2 … 𝑒′15
Fig. 2. The first three steps of the algorithm
correlation coefficient with the power consumed by the cryptosystem. Compare to use e′i to generate
hypothetical power, to use ei is better. Because a slight difference in the input of S-box leads to completely
different output, which makes performing a CPA attack more efficiently [Mangard et al., 2007]. In this
work, the output of the S-box is used to calculate the hypothetical power consumption (i.e. ei is selected
as the attack point). Combining with the encryption algorithm, the hypothetical power consumption H is
calculated by
H = HW (Sbox(x)), (13)
where HW denotes calculating the Hamming weight operation, x is the input of the substitution operation,
and Sbox is the substitution operation using the S-box lookup table.
3.2.3. The procedure of CPA attack
To run a CPA attack, plaintexts are randomly generated. These plaintexts are used as the input of the
cryptosystem and their corresponding power traces are collected. In order to reduce the computational
complexity, the 128-bits key is divided into 16 bytes. Each byte of the key is attacked separately. Then
the plaintexts and the possible keys are used to generate the hypothetical power consumption. Finally,
the correlation between the actual and hypothetical power consumption is calculated. The possible key
corresponding to the largest correlation coefficient is the most likely correct key. The details of attacking
the ith byte of round key (i.e. ki) are given below.
(a) Generate the plaintexts. D sets of plaintexts are generated randomly and stored in matrix C. The size
of C is D× I, where I is the number of bytes in each set of plaintexts. The symbol of cd,i denotes the
ith byte in the dth plaintexts.
(b) Collect the power consumption data. A total of D sets of plaintexts are used as input of the cryptosys-
tem. During the encryption process, a total of D sets of J-sample points power traces are stored in
matrix T . The size of T is D × J , where J is the number of sampling points in each power trace, td,j
denotes the sampling point j in trace d.
(c) Calculate the hypothetical power consumption. The procedure of generating the dth row of hypothetical
power matrix H i is shown in Fig. 3, where cd,i is the i
th byte of the dth block of plaintext, s is one
possible value of ki. Each possible value of ki is XORed with the cd,i. Then a substitution operation
is performed on the result of previous steps. The hypothetical power consumption is generated in the
next step by calculating the Hamming weight of the previous result. Similar steps are repeated for
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the rest of blocks to get the hypothetical power consumption matrix. The element in the hypothetical
power consumption matrix is calculated by
hid,s = HW (Sbox(cd,i ⊕ s)), (14)
where the (d, s)th element hid,s of H
i denotes the hypothetical power consumption corresponding to
the dth group of plaintexts and the possible value s ∈ [0, 255] of the ith key byte.
𝑐𝑑,𝑖
ℎ𝑑,0
𝑖
0 1 𝑠 255… …
ℎ𝑑,1
𝑖 ℎ𝑑,𝑠
𝑖 ℎ𝑑,255
𝑖
⊕
⊕
⊕
… …
⊕
𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥
𝐻𝑊
𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥
𝐻𝑊
𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥
𝐻𝑊
𝑆𝑏𝑜𝑥
𝐻𝑊
𝐻𝑊 denotes calculating 
the Hamming Weight 
operation
… …
……
Fig. 3. Calculating the hypothetical power correlated with the dth set of plaintexts
(d) Calculate the correlation between the actual and hypothetical power consumptions. The procedure of
calculating the correlation matrix P i is shown in Fig. 4. The matrix P i is generated by calculating the
correlation coefficient between each column of the matrix H i and each column of the matrix T . The
…
ℎ𝐷,0
𝑖 ℎ𝐷,1
𝑖
…
ℎ0,255
𝑖
ℎ1,255
𝑖
ℎ𝐷,255
𝑖
…
ℎ0,0
𝑖 ℎ0,1
𝑖
ℎ1,0
𝑖 ℎ1,1
𝑖
ℎ0,𝑠
𝑖
ℎ1,𝑠
𝑖
ℎ𝐷,𝑠
𝑖…
…
…
…
…
𝑡𝐷,0 𝑡𝐷,1
…
𝑡0,𝐽
𝑡1,𝐽
𝑡𝐷,𝐽
…
𝑡0,0 𝑡0,1
𝑡1,0 𝑡1,1
𝑡0,𝑗
𝑡1,𝑗
𝑡𝐷,𝑗
…
…
…
…
…
𝜌255,0
𝑖 𝜌255,1
𝑖
…
𝜌0,𝐽
𝑖
𝜌𝑠,𝐽
𝑖
𝜌255,𝐽
𝑖
…
𝜌0,0
𝑖 𝜌0,1
𝑖
𝜌𝑠,0
𝑖 𝜌𝑠,1
𝑖
𝜌0,𝑗
𝑖
𝜌𝑠,𝑗
𝑖
𝜌255,𝑗
𝑖…
…
…
…
… … …
… …
𝐻𝑖 𝑇
𝑃𝑖
𝑃
Fig. 4. The correlation coefficient calculation. ρis,j is the correlation coefficient between the s
th column of Hi (i.e. the
hypothetical power generated from the possible value s) and the jth column of T (i.e. the actual power consumption at
sampling point j). P denotes the operation to calculate Pearson correlation coefficient.
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Pearson correlation coefficient between the sth column in H i and the jth column in T is calculated by
ρis,j =
cov(H i:,s, T:,j)
σHi:,sσT:,j
=
∑D
d=1[(h
i
d,s − h¯is)(td,j − t¯j)]√∑D
d=1(h
i
d,s − h¯is)2
∑D
d=1(td,j − t¯j)2
, (15)
where H i:,s denotes the s
th column vector in matrix H i, T:,j denotes the j
th column vector in matrix
T , cov(H i:,s, T:,j) denotes the covariance between the column vector H
i
:,s and column vector T:,j , σHi:,s
denotes the standard deviation of column vector H i:,s, and h¯
i
s denotes the mean of H
i
:,s. The ρ
i
s,j
denotes the correlation between the hypothetical power calculated from the possible value s and the
actual power at the sampling point j. To understand the generation of matrix H i clearly, an example
is shown in Fig. 5. It shows the procedure of generating the sth row of P i, which is the correlation
between the hypothetical power generated from possible value s and the actual power consumption at
each sampling point. The correlation coefficient between the sth column of H i and each column of T
is calculated respectively, and the result is stored in the sth row of P i. The complete matrix P i can
be obtained by repeating similar operations. The row index of the largest ρis,j in P
i is the best guess
of ki. Repeat these operations to get the best guess of each byte of round key, then all the round keys
can be obtained.
ℎ𝐷,𝑠
𝑖
ℎ0,𝑠
𝑖
ℎ1,𝑠
𝑖
𝑡𝐷,0 𝑡𝐷,1
…
𝑡0,𝐽
𝑡1,𝐽
𝑡𝐷,𝐽
…
𝑡0,0 𝑡0,1
𝑡1,0 𝑡1,1
𝑡0,2
𝑡1,2
𝑡𝐷,2
…
…
…
…
𝜌𝑠,𝐽
𝑖𝜌𝑠,0
𝑖 𝜌𝑠,1
𝑖 𝜌𝑠,2
𝑖 …
𝑃
𝑃
𝑃
𝑃
Fig. 5. The procedure to calculate the sth row of P i
4. Experimental Results
This section firstly analyzes the security of the proposed cryptosystem through the statistical test. Then
the experimental platform is briefly introduced. In the last subsection, the CPA attack is carried out to
evaluate the security performance of the proposed system.
4.1. Statistical security tests
In this subsection, the security of the proposed cryptosystem is evaluated using the widely used statistical
tests [Liu et al., 2012; Tong et al., 2015], including the character frequency test, information entropy test,
dependence test, and SP 800-22 test.
May 4, 2018 14:49 output
10 Y. Luo et.al
4.1.1. Character frequency test
Character frequency is a crucial feature to analyze the security of a cryptographic algorithm. For example,
some substitution cryptographic algorithms can be attacked using the frequency of characters [Tong et al.,
2015]. For a good encryption algorithm, the ASCII value distribution of the ciphertext should be uniform.
In this paper, the character frequencies of 1,600,000 bytes of plaintext and their corresponding ciphertext
are calculated. The results are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. As shown in Fig. 6, the distribution of the
characters in plaintext is very nonuniform. From Fig. 7, it can be seen that the proportion of each ASCII
value is around 0.004, which is closed to the probability of uniform distribution 1/256. Therefore, it is
difficult to break this encryption algorithm using probability statistics attack [Tong et al., 2015].
4.1.2. Information entropy test
The information entropy measures the uncertainty of random events. The more uncertain the random
event, the larger the information entropy. The entropy of a random variable X is defined by
H(X) =
∑
x
p(x) log2
1
p(x)
, (16)
where H(X) denotes the entropy of random event X, p(x) stands for the possibility of X getting the result
x. In this work, the value of a byte (8 bits) is regarded as a random event. The entropy of these random
Fig. 6. The distribution of the ASCII values in the plaintext
Fig. 7. The distribution of the ASCII values in the ciphertext
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event denotes the minimum bits number to indicate these random events [Trappe & Washington, 2006]. If
the values of the bytes are uniformly distributed, the entropy of these bytes should be equal to eight [Tong
et al., 2015], i.e. p(x) = 1/256, x ∈ [0, 255]. The Eq. (16) turns into
H(X) =
255∑
x=0
1
256
log2
1
1/256
= 8. (17)
In this work after the analysis of 1,600,000 bytes ciphertext, the entropy is equal to 7.998942. It is very
close to eight, which means the ciphertext are well confused [Tong et al., 2015].
4.1.3. Dependence test
The dependence criteria can reflect the performance of the diffusion, and it is measured by the degree
of completeness dc, avalanche effects da and strict avalanche criterion dsa [Preneel et al., 2000]. For an
encryption algorithm, if any output bit is affected by all the input bits, this algorithm is complete. The
algorithm satisfies the avalanche effect, if about half number of ciphertext bits change when any bit of
plaintext changes. The algorithm meets the strict avalanche effect if each bit of ciphertext has a proba-
bility of 50% to change whenever any bit of the plaintext changes. To calculate those three parameters, a
dependence matrix A and a distance matrix B should be calculated first. A function with n bits input and
m bits output is denoted as f : (GF (2))n → (GF (2))m. The vector x(i) denotes the vector obtained by
complementing the ith bit of vector x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ (GF (2))n. The (i, j)th element in dependence matrix
A is denoted as aij . It denotes the number of inputs for which complementing the i
th input bit leads to
the jth output bit changing, i.e.
ai,j = #{x ∈ X|(f(x(i)))j 6= (f(x))j}, (18)
where the function of #{} calculates the number of elements in the set. The (i, j)th element in distance
matrix B is denoted as bij . It denotes the number of inputs for which complementing the i
th input bit
leads to j bits changing, i.e.
bi,j = #{x ∈ X|HW (f(x(i))⊕ f(x)) = j}. (19)
After computing the dependence matrix and the distance matrix, those three parameters of dc, da and
dsa can be calculated. The completeness is calculated by
dc = 1− #{(i, j)|ai,j = 0}
mn
. (20)
The avalanche is calculated by
da = 1−
∑n
i=1 | 1#X
∑m
j=1 2jbi,j −m|
mn
. (21)
The strict avalanche is calculated by
dsa = 1−
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 |2ai,j#X − 1|
mn
. (22)
An algorithm has a good dependence if the dc = 1, da ≈ 1, dsa ≈ 1. After analyzing 10,000,000 bits, the
parameters of the proposed algorithm are dc = 1, da = 0.99977 and dsa = 0.997468, thus the performance
of diffusion is qualified.
4.1.4. SP800-22 test
The SP 800-22 test is used to test the randomness of the sequence, and it includes 15 sub-tests [Tong
et al., 2015]. A good encryption algorithm should pass this test which indicates that it can resist statistical
attack [Deng et al., 2015]. After analyzing the 10,000,000 bits of ciphertext where the plaintext is generated
randomly, the results are shown in Table 1. It can be seen that the proposed cryptosystem passed all the
15 sub-tests which demonstrate the randomness of the output sequence.
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Table 1. SP800-22 test results
Statistical test p-value Conclusion
Frequency test 0.447884 pass
Block Frequency test (m=128) 0.113159 pass
Cumulative sums (forward) 0.503958 pass
Cumulative sums (reverse) 0.692403 pass
Rank test 0.309995 pass
Longest runs of ones test 0.964850 pass
Runs test 0.342874 pass
FFT test 0.571481 pass
Non-overlapping Templates test (m=9, B=000000001) 0.898738 pass
Overlapping Template test (m=9) 0.858003 pass
Universal test 0.720205 pass
Approximate entropy (m=10) 0.629128 pass
Random Excursions (x=+1) 0.815800 pass
Random Excursions Variant (x=-1) 0.472917 pass
Linear Complexity (M=500) 0.057064 pass
Serial (m=16) 0.656760 pass
4.2. Security analysis under CPA attacks
4.2.1. Experimental platform
The experimental platform for the power analysis attack usually consists of four parts: a power supplier,
cryptosystem hardware device, power consumption captor, and power consumption analyzer. In this work,
the proposed cryptosystem is implemented using an Atmel XMEGA128D4 micro controller, see Fig. 8(c).
The power consumption of the cryptosystem is collected by a Xilinx Spartan 6 device-based FPGA board
via the sub-miniature version A (SMA) and the universal synchronous/asynchronous receiver/transmitter
(USART) connections to the cryptosystem, see Fig. 8(b). The collected power consumption data is trans-
mitted to the computer through a universal serial bus (USB) and analyzed by a software. The system clock
of the hardware cryptosystem and the sampling frequency are controlled by the FPGA device, where the
latter is set to be four times of the former for the power sampling. The computer software can initial-
ize the FPGA device, control the communications between the hardware systems, and analyze the power
consumption data while the cryptosystem is under the CPA attacks.
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 8. The cryptosystem and the CPA platform. (a) CPA software, (b) CPA hardware system and (c) Cryptosystem.
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4.2.2. Experimental data analysis
To carry out the CPA attack, one hundred 128-bit plaintexts are generated randomly and used as the input
of cryptosystem. One hundred groups of corresponding power consumption data are collected. Each group
data contains 3,000 sample points. One group of power consumption data is shown in Fig. 9, which is ob-
tained when the cryptosystem encrypts one plaintext. For the total 100 plaintexts, the power consumption
data is stored in a matrix T , where the (d, j)th element td,j denotes the sampling point j while encrypting
the dth plaintext.
In order to attack the ith byte ki of the first group of round keys, the corresponding hypothetical
power consumption matrix H i is calculated. The sth column vector H i:,s denotes the hypothetical power
consumption corresponding to the possible value s of the key-byte ki. Then the correlation coefficients
between every column vector of H i and every column vector of T are calculated. For the byte ki, the
guessed value which corresponds to the largest correlation coefficient is mostly like the actual key, and this
Fig. 9. Power consumption curve in time domain
Table 2. The best key guesses and their point index
Byte index Actual key Largest correlation coefficient Second largest correlation coefficient
Guessed value Correlation Point Index Guessed value Correlation coefficient
0 0x25 0x25 0.847 403 0x44 0.435
1 0x47 0x47 0.913 448 0x00 0.411
2 0x88 0x88 0.865 516 0x1D 0.459
3 0xE3 0xE3 0.863 584 0x9C 0.474
4 0x35 0x35 0.815 652 0x74 0.463
5 0x65 0x65 0.900 720 0x30 0.438
6 0xC1 0xC1 0.816 788 0xED 0.466
7 0x76 0x76 0.868 856 0x34 0.481
8 0xE1 0xE1 0.867 924 0x97 0.418
9 0x39 0x39 0.847 992 0x3F 0.451
10 0x6E 0x6E 0.867 1060 0x2C 0.441
11 0xD1 0xD1 0.799 1128 0xA0 0.467
12 0x58 0x58 0.863 1196 0x42 0.436
13 0xA8 0xA8 0.869 1264 0xB0 0.450
14 0xA5 0xA5 0.813 1332 0xEB 0.481
15 0xAC 0xAC 0.648 1383 0xCF 0.473
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value is called as the best key guess of the byte ki. The CPA attack result is shown in Table 2, where its
actual value and the best key guess are shown for every ki and i ∈ [0, 15]. The best key guesses are equal
to the actual keys, and the points where the best key guesses obtained are shown in Table 2. The possible
values corresponding to the second largest correlation coefficients are also given which are much lower than
the best key guesses. Table 2 shows that the correlation coefficients between the power consumption and
the correct key guesses are around 0.8, and the correlation coefficients between the power consumption and
the incorrect key guesses are less than 0.5. It is shown that using the CPA method and the Hamming weight
model, the correct key can be obtained, and the differences between the correct key and the incorrect key
are obvious.
4.2.3. Efficiency analysis of CPA attack
In order to evaluate the efficient of the proposed power consumption model, i.e. hid,s = HW (Sbox(cd,i ⊕
s)), the relations between actual and hypothetical power consumption are analyzed. As the procedure of
attacking each byte of the key is similar, the following analysis focus on attacking the first key byte k0.
The actual power consumption data in the 403th column of trace matrix T and the hypothetical power
consumption corresponding to the correct key 0x25 are firstly normalized between 0 and 1. Then they are
shown in Fig. 10. It can be seen that the actual power consumption and hypothetical power consumption
calculated through the proposed model are negatively related, i.e. the data proceed by the cryptographic
system can be attacked using leaked power consumption information.
The correlation between the actual power consumption and the hypothetical power consumption cal-
culated from the correct key guess is shown in Fig. 11 (a). If one bit of the correct guess is changed, and
the changed value is used as the input of the model, the correlation between the actual power consumption
and the hypothetical power consumption is shown in Fig. 11 (b). The relatively high correlation coefficient
for the correct guess and low correlation coefficient for the incorrect guess show that this model can well
characterize the power consumption of the micro controller with pre-charge buses [Mangard et al., 2007].
Therefore, the cryptosystem can be attacked using the proposed method.
4.2.4. Performance improvement
Each piece of power consumption data contains 3,000 sampling points, while only some of them are valuable
for the CPA attack. Thus, dividing the power consumption data into several stages, and carrying out the
CPA attack in one particular stage can reduce the computational complexity. The power consumption curve
of encrypting one piece of plaintext is shown in Fig. 9. From the general outline, each stage can be roughly
separated. From point 0 to point 330, there are 16 similar peaks, and the time consumption is relatively
low. Therefore, this stage is consisted by 16 identical simple operations. In this stage, the plain text are
Fig. 10. Power consumption varies with plaintext
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(a) (b)
Fig. 11. Correlations of hypothetical and actual power consumption
in the operations of XOR with the intermediate cipher keys. From point 380 to point 1,400, there are 16
similar peaks, but the time consumption is greater than the previous stage. In this stage, the substitution
operation is carried out. According to the previous analysis in Section 3.2, carrying the CPA attack in this
stage performs very well. Through CPA attacks, the points where the best correlation coefficient of each
ki obtained are marked with red points. The locations of these red points verify that the various stages
of the encryption process are divided correctly, by analyzing the shape of the power consumption curve.
Conducting CPA attack in this stage can significantly reduce the computational complexity by 60%.
4.2.5. Discussion
A chaotic block cryptographic system was attacked using the CPA attack in this paper. It is only an example
and it should be noted that other chaotic block ciphers can also be attacked using the SCA attack, if the
cryptographic system leaks the side channel information correlated with the data processed or the operation
performed. In most of chaotic block ciphers, round keys are generated from the master key using chaotic
maps at the beginning of the encryption, and they participate in each round of cryptographic operations.
During those operations, there are some intermediate values that correlate with the plaintext and the round
keys. When the cryptographic hardware system process those intermediate values, the corresponding side
channel information probably leaks. Therefore, round keys can be attacked by analyzing the correlation
between the hypothetical and actual side channel information. The hypothetical information is calculated
from a model which maps the hypothetical intermediate values to hypothetical side channel information.
The model used in this paper is a Hamming Weight model, which maps the hypothetical intermediate values
Sbox(cd,i⊕s) to hypothetical power consumption hid,s = HW (Sbox(cd,i⊕s)) as illustrated in Section 3.2.3.
It can be also applied to other chaotic block cryptographic systems. The intermediate values being attacked
are selected according the features of the ciphers and it is correlated with the plaintext and the round keys.
Therefore theoretically, the CPA can attack most of chaotic block cipher hardware systems if the correct
intermediate values and the power consumption model are selected.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a chaotic block cryptographic system was designed and implemented based on an Atmel
XMEGA128D4 micro controller. The proposed cryptographic algorithm passed the conventional statistical
security tests including SP 800-22, avalanche test, character frequency test. The CPA was carried out
to attack the proposed cryptographic system. Results showed that although the cryptographic algorithm
passed the statistical tests, its critical information such as intermediate round keys can still be analyzed
by the CPA attack using the leaked power consumption information when the hardware cryptosystem is
in operation. This paper proposed another direction to evaluate the security performances of the chaotic
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hardware cryptosystems. Future work will investigate the chaotic cryptosystems that can resist the CPA
attack, and design mechanisms to increase the security of the chaotic hardware systems.
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